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Parties of the extreme Right now have arole in the governments and/or the par-
liaments of several European countries,
including Flanders (northern Belgium1),
France, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland.
They now have a share in political power in
these countries, directly or indirectly, locally
or nationally, alone or in coalitions. What
was widely feared—for example, vis-à-vis the
Front National in France2—has to a sig-
nificant extent become the reality. And as
power went from democratic hands to
these new parties, the words used to describe
these parties were changed: the neo-Nazis
became “parties with extremist trends”;
the fascists became the radical Right or
national Right. 
As yesterday’s fascists have entered gov-
ernment, such word-changes have made it
increasingly difficult to identify the extreme
right in contemporary Europe. Can one
still apply the term fascist to a xenophobic
party like the Lega Nord3 now that it has
been in power (with Forza Italia led by Sil-
vio Berlusconi) for many years? Can one
view France’s Front National as a mere relic
of Pétainism when it made it into the sec-
ond round of the presidential election
(May 2002) and when cities such as
Toulon, Orange, Marignane and Vitrolles
have had mayors from the FN? In what
terms is it possible to stigmatize the Vlaams
Blok4 in northern Belgium—a direct off-
shoot of pro-Nazi collaboration during
World War II—when this party is one of
the most powerful in Flanders? It is very
hard to use the old words to characterize
those parties in power today. It was a lot eas-
ier yesterday when they were small and noisy
racist parties instead of the big powerful
actors they have now become.
Words and Actions
To address this concern, we need tofocus on how these parties have acted
once they got into office. Let us look more
closely at the cases of Austria, France, and
Belgium.
Jörg Haider and his Austrian Freedom
party (FPÖ)5 often showed their fascination
for Nazism and its xenophobic views of 
politics. Among many examples, he said
that the Waffen SS “were part of the
Wehrmacht, and therefore deserve honor
and respect like other armies.”6 Speaking
about the concentration camp of Mau-
thausen, Haider called it “a simple punitive
camp.” Regarding migrants and foreigners,
he has been very clear: “Africans in Austria
are drug dealers who try to seduce our
youth. We have the Polish who steal cars,
the ex-Yugoslavs who are experts in robbery,
the Turks who are responsible for the heroin
traffic, the Russians who specialize in the
black market and in violent assaults.”
Regarding Slovenians from Carpathia
(Haider’s stronghold), the FPÖ leader said
that they “have sex with dogs and should
not be surprised to wake up with fleas.” 
In 1999, with a huge propaganda 
campaign against migrants, against elites
and against the European Union, the
FPÖ got 26.9% in the national election.
The outcome was a coalition between the
FPÖ and the ÖVP (the conservative
party), a coalition which has been criticized
by most of the European governments.
Following what would come to be known
as the “Haider affair,” the European Union
decided to vote sanctions against Austria
to protest its acceptance of a fascist party
in power.
After a few months of embargo against
Austria, the European Union decided to
bring in a special commission to evaluate
the policies of the FPÖ/ÖVP coalition in
order to see if migrants and minorities
were suffering under this new xenophobic
government. The conclusions of the report
are most interesting. It said that although
the FPÖ was a “populist party with extrem-
ist trends that promote xenophobic
speech,”7 it was impossible to prove a dif-
ference between Austria and other countries
in their treatment of foreigners. More pre-
cisely, the report said, “in some domains,
and notably regarding the rights of the
national minorities, the Austrian standard
could be considered higher than standards
in other nations within the European
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This issue’s lead article examines the mainstreaming of fascist parties in present-dayWestern Europe. The scenario is one in which those parties have largely shed their
extreme-right image without, in the process, giving up their defining agenda. They remain
profoundly racist even if they no longer boast of their racism. Although their support-
ers include many people who are ill served economically by the prevailing system, their
coalition partners—when they have them—are parties committed to preserving the eco-
nomic status quo. This is in the grand tradition of 20th-century fascism, which from its
beginnings railed against privilege while pandering to capital and serving it faithfully
once in power.
In the United States, no fascist party has entered the electoral arena, but the trade-
mark goals embraced historically by such parties have been attained through other chan-
nels. Military aggression, the scrapping of international treaties, preventive detention,
widespread torture of prisoners, and the ethnic screening of immigrants have been imple-
mented without any need for the prior services of an avowedly fascist party. It has all
come about under the authority of at least one and sometimes both of the “established”
political parties. 
How this has happened is a complex story, many of whose components are already
familiar to readers of The Public Eye. At the core of the process are traditions of acquis-
itiveness, vigilantism, aggressive religiosity, and a peculiarly arrogant patriotism—form-
ing a mindset whose more authoritative public expressions are couched in a persistent
euphemistic rhetoric of diversity and moderation. In what follows, I will explore some
recent manifestations of this discursive swamp, in terms of how they reflect the larger
global agenda that has driven U.S. policy since before the end of World War II.
The 9/11 attacks have supplied the pretext for the U.S. government to reaffirm andintensify its global role. The significant increase in the scope—and the brazenness—
of U.S. interventionism invites comparison with the immediate post-World War II period.
As in that earlier period, it has been necessary for the government to enlist popular sup-
port for policies which in themselves, especially when they come to involve tangible sac-
rifices, are bound to be unpopular. In both cases, this has entailed creating a climate of
fear, which has meant on the one hand constructing an “enemy” and, on the other, set-
ting up a machinery of institutionalized intimidation.1
Constructing an enemy means portraying as a threat to the whole people what is in
fact a threat only to the corporate interests that permeate the U.S. government. What
threatens these interests is any movement (or associated regime) that might reduce the
scope of their activity anywhere in the world. Turning such movements into “enemies”
means linking them in people’s minds with scenarios of being brought under some kind
of foreign military subjugation—or, in the more recent setting, of being exposed to a
permanent threat of sudden attack, with the latter seen as something undertaken by









Founder and President Emerita
Jean V. Hardisty, Ph.D.
Staff 
Roberta Salper, Ph.D. Executive Director
Chip Berlet, Senior Analyst
Pam Chamberlain, Researcher
Shelly Harter, Database Manager
Tom Louie, Director of Development 
and Communications












The Public Eye is published by Political Research
Associates. Subscriptions are $29.00 for individuals
and non-profit organizations, $39.00 for other
organizations, $19.00 for students and low-income
individuals. Outside U.S., Canada, and Mexico, add
$9.00 for surface delivery or $14.00 for air mail.
Please make checks payable to Political Research
Associates, 1310 Broadway, Suite 201, 
Somerville, Massachusetts 02144-1731. 
617.666.5300    fax: 617.666.6622
PRA is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization. All
donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted
by law. © Political Research Associates, 2004. 
Website: www.publiceye.org 




* I am grateful to Chip Berlet, Pam Chamberlain, and Roberta Salper for their encouragement and suggestions. I take
full responsibility, however, for all opinions expressed in this essay.
Union.”8 The Haider affair gave a clear mes-
sage to the progressive community. The
immediate policies implemented by right-
wing parties do not necessarily give an
accurate indication of their agenda. 
The French example illustrates this fur-
ther. In June 1995, after local elections, the
Front National had mayors in office in three
cities: Jean-Marie Le Chevallier in Toulon
(pop. 175,000), Daniel Simonpieri in
Marignane (32,000) and Jacques Bompart
in Orange (28,000). Two years later,
Catherine Mégret took office in Vitrolles
(45,000). Since the beginning of the ‘80s,
the leader and founder of the FN had
many opportunities to show his nostalgia
for Pétain and his xenophobic view of
France and Europe. Talking about race,
Jean-Marie Le Pen said in August 1996: “I
believe there is inequality between races.
That is obvious. History shows it. Races do
not have the same ability in terms of evo-
lution.”9 One month later, he added that
during the Olympic games he saw “an
obvious inequality between black race and
white race,” suggesting that while black
people excelled in sports, they were infe-
rior in intelligence. Regarding the Holo-
caust, Le Pen said in September 1987 that
while he didn’t deny the existence of gas
chambers, he personally did not see any of
them, he wondered about it, and anyway
“it was a detail of the history of the second
World War.” This was said at a time when
several “historians” were trying to raise
the idea that gas chambers did not exist. 
In this way, Le Pen was supporting the
works of these negationist10 “historians.”
Recently, in 2004, the FN’s number-two
man Bruno Gollnish went in the same
direction when he said: “I did not question
the existence of concentration camps.… I
question the numbers of victims. Histori-
ans should debate it.” This year again, Le
Pen came back with the idea that “the
German occupation [of France] was not
especially inhuman”11 and that we have
been too strict about Nazi treatment of the
French population during World War II.
Once the Front National got enough
votes to elect four mayors, the progressive
community focused attention on how
Toulon, Marignane, Orange (and two
years later Vitrolles) were being governed.
It was about time to see how old words like
fascism and Nazism could still make sense
in analyzing the extreme right in power. The
first year brought many scandalous deci-
sions. Among other examples, we can
mention the withdrawal of many “pro-
gressive books” from public libraries in
those cities and the purchase of literature
very favorable to the Front National and
Le Pen—a leader who eventually hoped to
see his own hagiographies on the shelves.
Let’s also mention the proposal by Cather-
ine Mégret to offer a grant for any “French
white mother” in Vitrolles who would
have a baby and register it.12 Finally, let’s
mention the money the mayors put into
new uniforms for the police when they
stopped financing a “bunch of leftist” asso-
ciations viewed as enemies of the FN. But
although many of these early measures
reflected the real nature of the Front
National, several years in office have not
helped the progressive community to
demonstrate dangerous links between
words and acts, between the FN and a 
fascist threat. In brief, the FN could with-
draw books from libraries and support the
police, but they were not starting to set up
an authoritarian state in France, nor did
they hold a book-burning rally.
A third example deserves our atten-
tion. The separatist nationalist Vlaams
Blok (VB, Flemish Bloc) has been grow-
ing continuously since 1978 and, accord-
ing to recent opinion polls, has now become
the leading party in Flanders. Like the
Front National in France, the VB has had
many opportunities to reveal links with
(and nostalgia for) Nazism and the col-
laboration. The old founder of the Vlaams
Blok was a member of the Vlaams National
Verbond, a fascist group that collaborated
with the Nazis. And Philip Dewinter, one
of the leading figures of the Blok, never
misses an occasion to show his racist views.
In 1990, he said that he and his fellows were
“for a total amnesty regarding acts of 
collaboration during the war.”13 Speaking
about migrants and foreigners, Dewinter
said in 1991, “Only prostitutes leave their
doors open. We don’t want to transform
Flanders into a public brothel open to any
foreigners from Africa or Asia.”14 The
same year, after having been accused of
racism, Dewinter had this interesting
reply: “If people say we are racist because
we apply the principle ‘Our people first’
and give priority to it, then we consider
racism an honorable title!”15
The Vlaams Blok is today one the most
powerful extremist parties in Europe. But
although the VB is, according to surveys,
the number one party in northern Belgium,
it never got the opportunity to enter a coali-
tion in any government because of the
principle of the cordon sanitaire (quaran-
tine). Launched in 1989 by parties of the
Left, the cordon sanitaire has led to a tacit
agreement among “democratic” parties to
avoid any coalition with the Vlaams Blok.
Through personal commitment of deputies
or collective commitment from parties, the
VB has been kept out of all posts and posi-
tions of power in Belgium. The party has
hundreds of deputies at all levels, but none
of them could show how they would act if
they held executive office.
The cordon sanitaire has given the VB,
like the Austrian FPÖ and the French
Front National, the appearance of a dem-
ocratic party; its members have been in
public councils for twenty years without
being able to implement a fascist program.
Once again, the progressive community
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not necessarily give an 
accurate indication 
of their agenda. 
had to deal with an obvious contradiction
between old, deep and strong words (fas-
cism, Nazism, etc.) and daily life with a
party which, whatever its rhetoric, lacked
the opportunity to differentiate itself in
practical terms from others. Even worse, it
had to deal with a democracy that institutes
a quarantine against an elected party to keep
it out of power. Does it still deserve to be
called a democracy?
The Extreme Right and the 
Elections
Focusing on the words of the extremeright might be useful for showing its his-
torical links with the fascism of the 1930s,
or to highlight the racist views of some of
its leaders. But this understanding is not
enough to convince the electorate that the
extreme right is a threat to democracy and
to democratic values. What accounts for this
difficulty?
In the first place, like the FN and the
FPÖ, extremist leaders from all over Europe
learned through the years how to use dem-
ocratic rhetoric to legitimate the access of
xenophobic parties to government coali-
tions. Parties like Die Republikaner (REP)
or the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) in
Germany, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) or
Fremskridtspartiet (FP) in Denmark, the
British National Party (BNP), the Lijst Pim
Fortuyn in the Netherlands, Ny Demokrati
in Sweden, and Schweizer Volkspartei in
Switzerland, have all received large num-
bers of votes at several levels of power for
many years. On the basis of their votes, they
claim a “democratic” mandate to oppose
the democratic values that the progressive
community defends against them
(antiracism and so on). The extremists
reduce democracy to mere numbers of
votes, without acknowledging that it
depends also on principles such as toler-
ance, pluralism and debate. Progressives,
for their part, invoke these principles to
show the threat posed by the extreme right
to European democracies. As scholar Guy
Hermet says, extremists, populists and
democrats fight each other for the people
and for legitimacy.16 The problem, however,
is that democracies depend not only on
elections, but also on values. 
A strong example can illustrate our
point. French presidential elections are
organized in two rounds. Many candi-
dates may take part in the first round, but
if none of them receives more than 50% of
the vote, then a second round is held in
which only the top two candidates par-
ticipate. In May 2002, after weeks of a
pathetic electoral battle17 between the can-
didates of the two leading parties (Prime
Minister Lionel Jospin for the Socialist
Party and President Jacques Chirac for the
Union for the Majority), the fight to get
into the second round ended with a big sur-
prise. Jean-Marie Le Pen from the Front
National got more votes than Jospin and
went to the second round against Chirac.
As the leftist daily paper Libération put it
at that time,18 voters could then choose
between “l’escroc et le facho” (the crook and
the fascist19). While many intellectuals,
singers, artists and politicians denounced
Le Pen’s fascist heritage, he could claim
democratic legitimacy on the basis of his
first-round vote. He presented himself as
an embodiment of democracy. Once again,
democracy as electoral process clashed
with democracy as a set of values and prin-
ciples. The two pillars of the system were
at odds.
Why is it so hard to tell people about
the extremist threat to democracy? A sec-
ond explanation lies in the evolution of
extremist parties over the past twenty
years. In all European countries, there are
laws to curb racist, xenophobic and “nega-
tionist” rhetoric. Enacted in response to
the electoral success of extreme right par-
ties, these laws punish incitement to racist
behaviour, notably against foreigners and
migrants. After many convictions in Bel-
gium, France, the Netherlands and other
countries, most of the extremist leaders
have changed the way they talk about
World War II and about migrants in gen-
eral. To evade laws against racist rhetoric,
they replaced their overt xenophobia with
a defense of ethnic homogeneity. Instead
of attacking foreigners, they advocated
the right to cultural expression for their
own people;20 they set aside their nostal-
gia for fascism to champion their European
heritage. Except for the Front National
with its leaders who maintain their nega-
tionist rhetoric, most of the parties tried
to change their discourse in order to avoid
legal challenges and to give a better image
of themselves to the electorate. 
Ever since the early ‘80s, the progressive
community has warned the public about
links between extremist parties and Nazi
Germany, Pétainist France or Fascist Italy.
Paradoxically, however (and this is a third
element in our analysis), the success of the
extremist leaders in responding to the legal
threats against them served at the same time
to cover up such historical links. The leg-
islation led them to change their language.
It also showed them how to look respectable
in the eyes of the public opinion. Convic-
tions in court led many actors to change
their rhetoric and their image in order to
avoid stereotypes denounced by progres-
sives. Today, most extremist parties hide
their connection with skinheads and avoid
offensive language; the leaders are polite and
most of them wear suits and ties like dem-
ocratic politicians.21 Parties have changed
their face and don’t scare the public any-
more. Thus it is harder for the progressive
community to tell the electorate that those
parties are dangerous.
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The extremists reduce
democracy to mere
numbers of votes, 
without acknowledging
that it depends also on
principles such as 
tolerance, pluralism 
and debate.
The new face of the extreme right leads
to some confusion regarding the difference
between the democratic and the non-dem-
ocratic right. An example is the title of a
recent book by Hans-Georg Betz: La droite
populiste en Europe: Extrême et démocrate?
(The Populist Right in Europe: Extreme
and Democratic?).22 It is true that distinc-
tions between the “soft” and the “hard”
right are not as clear as before. Thus, the
three main political issues of the extreme
right (crime, unemployment and immi-
gration) were taken up by most of the tra-
ditional parties. The myth of Europe under
siege and the threat of uncontrolled migra-
tion and crime in the streets are no longer
peddled just by the heirs of fascism. These
themes have been mainstream for years,
even on the Left, as Socialist or Green
coalitions in France and Belgium have
joined in the expulsion of illegal migrants.
But although crime, immigration and
unemployment have become mainstream
issues, asserting systematic causal links
among them remains an extremist char-
acteristic. Only Le Pen, Dewinter and
Haider persistently identify migrants with
criminals and the unemployed, or speak of
Muslims (especially since 9/11) as terror-
ists. In fact, with an obvious link between
radical Islam and terrorism, many parties
used the event to explain how they were not
racist against the Muslims but wanted to
protect Europe from terrorism and fun-
damentalism. 
The question remains, however, of
whether the extreme right, despite the
change in its image, has undergone any
change in its essential nature.
Defining the Extreme Right
Between the old fascist rhetoric withboots and brown shirts and the new
polite discourse about enemies of Europe,23
is there a way to define the extreme right?
If we look at the literature on the extreme
right in Europe, a first characteristic of it is
clearly the idea of extreme nationalism.
This means the conception of a people
with sacred ties to a specific territory; it
implies a very inflexible identity which
shuffles racial, ethnic, biological, linguistic
and cultural characteristics. A second fea-
ture of the extreme right would be racism,
xenophobia, homophobia and anti-Semi-
tism as attitudes stimulated by the party to
protect the people—partly against out-
siders who threaten its homogeneity (for-
eigners, migrants, Jews, etc.) and partly
against internal enemies who threaten the
future of the race (homosexuals, repro-
ductive rights activists, etc.). The hunt for
enemies leads to a third feature: the ideol-
ogy of “Law and Order.” In fact, protect-
ing the homogeneous white nation means
building an authoritarian regime to repress
internal enemies and a strong army for the
fight against external ones. Other charac-
teristics include hostility to democracy and
parliamentarism, along with hatred of plu-
ralism, debate and tolerance. Underlying all
these traits, however, the belief in racial
inequality—and, in fact, in race itself—is
the common core of all definitions.24
Returning to the parties discussed above,
we can conclude two things. Most of the
parties are extreme in terms of political rhet-
oric, but not in terms of their political activ-
ity in office (when they have been in office,
which has not been the case for the Vlaams
Blok so far). Although it may seem para-
doxical, we might say that we cannot eval-
uate the extreme right in office today
because it never got power by itself but only
in coalitions, which means sharing com-
mon objectives with democratic parties.
Even when its coalition partners are con-
servative, the European Union acts as a
restraining factor, as we saw vis-à-vis the
FPÖ of Jörg Haider. This probably explains
the gap between old fascist rhetoric and
daily action. 
The Front National and the
Vlaams Blok
Although some parties might be morepopulist than extremist,25 the Front
National and the Vlaams Blok fit our 
criteria for extremism. Both of them cham-
pion an extreme nationalism to protect
the French people and the Flemish people
against foreigners, migrants, Walloons,26
Jews, and other kinds of enemies such as
homosexuals or pro-abortion activists.
Both the FN and the VB have direct links
with World War II collaborationists, and
both display nostalgia for fascist leaders.
The two parties have developed a racist
rhetoric for years, and they persistently link
criminality with migrants and call for
strengthening the police and the state.
The fact that they fit the extreme right
definition is significant because they are the
most powerful parties in that category in
Europe. Let us now look at their electoral
base. In regional councils, the FN went
from 137 deputies in 1986 and 237
deputies in 1992 to 275 deputies in 1998
and 156 deputies in 2004. At the national
level for the legislative elections in the par-
liament, the FN had 25 deputies in 1986.
After the abandonment of proportional
representation, the FN saw this number
reduced to 1 in 1988, 0 in 1993, 1 in 1997,
and 0 in 2002. In elections to the European
Parliament, the FN got 10 representatives
in 1984 and 1989, 11 in 1994, 5 in 1999,
and 7 (including Le Pen himself ) in 2004.
At the presidential level, Le Pen got 0.75%
of the vote in 1974, 14.4% in 1988, 15%
in 1995, and 17% in the first round for his
second-place finish in 2002 (an amount to
which he added less than 1% in the second
round). These figures show that the party
has a continuing impact on French politics
at all levels.
Although the Vlaams Blok has been
excluded from administrative office at all
levels by the cordon sanitaire, it has con-
tinuously increased its representation, its
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role and its influence as an important part
of the opposition. At the local level, the VB
progressed from 2 deputies in one local
council in 1982 (in Antwerp, the biggest
city in Flanders) to 23 deputies in 10
councils in 1988, 204 deputies in 86 coun-
cils in 1994, and 461 deputies in 163
councils in 2000. At the provincial level
(Belgium has 9 provinces), the VB went
from 2 deputies in 1978 and 1985 to 36
deputies in 1991, 34 in 1994, and 54 in
2000. In the federal parliament, the VB
started with 1 deputy from 1978 to 1985.
It got 18 deputies in 1991 (during what has
come to be known as Black Sunday), 32 in
1995, 43 in 1999, 49 in 2003, and finally
64 in 2004. The Vlaams Blok is today as
powerful as the main traditional parties. In
the European elections, the VB got 1
deputy in 1989, 2 in 1994 and 1999, and
3 in 2004. The VB is thus one of the most
powerful parties Flanders today, a position
which is confirmed by opinion polls.
What can we say for the future? Insofar
as the Front National maintains its aggres-
sive rhetoric of nostalgia, Holocaust denial
and xenophobia, it will continue to tap a
protest vote. The presidential election of
May 2002 showed that people were voting
less for the FN than against the other par-
ties. The Front National thus appears to
have a future as an anti-system party but
not as a participant in governing coalitions
with the main traditional parties. The sit-
uation is very different for the Vlaams
Blok, which, as a result of court convictions,
has changed its name, a part of its program,
and some of its rhetoric. The VB person-
ifies Flemish nationalism against Unitar-
ian Belgium and “cosmopolitan Europe.”
As a deeply rooted party becoming
“respectable,” it may well enter future
coalitions and become “mainstream.”
Using the old terms fascism and Nazism to
characterize it might then seem to be out
of place. But no amount of “mainstream-
ing” will change the party’s basic goals.  
Jérôme Jamin is a researcher in Political
Science, University of Liège, Belgium.
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Defending Justice
Almost two years in the making, this new publication in PRA’s popular
Activist Resource Kit series for activists  analyzes the forces that grow
and strengthen the current Criminal Justice System.
Defending Justice, PRA’s latest Activist Resource Kit discusses the inter-
sections between the Right-wing agenda and the Criminal Justice System. 
Through articles, factsheets, graphics and more, Defending Justice
analyzes and critiques the origins, ideology
and tactics of the following:
✓ The Rise of the “Tough on Crime”
Movement and Quality 
of Life Policing
✓War on Youth, Zero Tolerance and
the School Safety Movement
✓ Religious Prison Organizations
(Prison Fellowship Ministries 
and the Nation of Islam) and 
the Faith Based Initiative
✓ The Criminalization of 
Indian Country and the 
Anti-Sovereignty Movement
✓ Victims’ Rights Movement
✓War on Terrorism
✓ Mandatory Sentencing and the War on Drugs
✓ Reproductive Rights and the Criminalization of Women 
of Color
✓ NRA and gun culture, prison guard unions, ALEC and more
This 200+ page resource includes:
✓Overview and topical articles on the Right’s ideology, 
agenda, and tactics and how it intersects with the growth 
of the Prison Industrial Complex
✓ Description of “Get Tough” Arguments, Responses and 
Tips on Challenging the Right
✓ Samples of Right Wing Literature
✓ Annotated Lists on Right-wing Criminal Justice




…available at (617) 666-5300 or
www.publiceye.org
A NEW ACTIVIST RESOURCE KIT 
BY POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
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By Pam Chamberlain
Extracts [pp. 2-4, 35-39] from Deliberate
Differences: Progressive and Conservative
Campus Activism in the United States, a
Political Research Associates report by Pam
Chamberlain (2005), 84 pp.
Our findings are summarized as follows:
1Energetic college students allover the country are engaged in
campus-based activism, but their
numbers are small. Although both
conservative and progressive students organ-
ize on campus, the sum total of activist stu-
dents is small compared to the overall
student population. Progressive organiza-
tions outnumber conservative groups by a
4:1 ratio, with a range of issue-specific
groups being the norm for progressives
and a single, general conservative organi-
zation the core of conservative campus
strength. According to the Higher Educa-
tion Research Institute at UCLA, almost
equal numbers of first-year students iden-
tified as progressive and conservative in
2003: 27% as progressive, and 23% as
conservative. Perhaps just as relevant is the
fact that 50% of first-year students label
themselves independent or unaffiliated. 
Campus activists are confronted with
the challenge of mobilizing the vast major-
ity of students who have other priorities
besides political activity. Despite unpromis-
ing odds, small numbers of campus activists
create and often sustain a wide range of
campaigns, representing various perspec-
tives on issues related to the environment,
labor, reproductive rights, free speech, les-
bian/gay/bisexual/transgender (LGBT)
people, multiculturalism, and the war.
When major issues emerge, as they did in
2003, like the war in Iraq and affirmative
action in university admissions, activists are 
able to generate a high level of student inter-
est and mass mobilizations.
2Conservative and progressivestudents approach activism dif-
ferently. Because there are fewer conser-
vative organizations on campus, usually a
core group of activists coordinates cam-
paigns across several issues. Progressives
tend to maintain an array of issue-based
organizations that do not regularly function
with a coordinated strategy unless they
create a coalition of progressive groups. 
Conservatives’ shared view of them-
selves as being in the minority and endur-
ing a hostile environment on campus
shapes their public education and politi-
cal activity. They tend to use “fortress 
reasoning,” focusing on the need to pro-
tect themselves from their numerous oppo-
nents. Conservative activists recast some
of the terms that have proved successful for
progressives in the past, such as valuing
freedom of speech and diversity. Progres-
sives, however, share no such common
message; instead, they usually generate
multiple issue-based messages from their
various organizations. They describe a
common feeling of fragmentation.
We were interested in the level of ten-
sions between activist groups that tradi-
tionally disagreed on hot-button topics.
The war in Iraq and the affirmative action
court cases created a focus for both con-
servative and progressive activists. 
3Political mentors are absentfrom campus. Virtually all the stu-
dent leaders we interviewed described them-
selves as arriving at college with their politics
already developed. For the most part, their
political mentors were their parents or
teachers. Both conservative and progressive
students expressed disappointment that
they could not find similar mentors on cam-
pus, especially from the faculty. In turn, the
majority of the faculty we interviewed pre-
ferred to remain distant or exhibited dis-
interest when asked about their
involvement with campus political groups.
A few faculty members, mostly progressive,
were actively engaged with student
activism. All our sample schools had Stu-
dent Affairs Offices that provided, at a min-
imum, organizational support and training
to student groups. However, student lead-
ers rarely mentioned staff in these offices
as their mentors. Without access to ideo-
logical or strategic support on campus,
students report they seek it elsewhere.
4Students are responding toissues of race, gender, and sex-
ual orientation as they perceive
them on campus. Progressive activists
observe forms of racism, sexism, and homo-
phobia persisting at their schools, despite
the impact that previous activism has had
on higher education. They view their work
as far from over. Conservative students
challenge progressive assessments and com-
pensatory practices, dismissing them as
“unnecessary” programs, “substandard”
academic offerings, or simply “unfair.”
National conservative spokespeople stim-
ulate discussion on these topics, providing
students with arguments against affirmative
action, feminism, multiculturalism, and
area academic programs such as Queer
Studies.
Activists at the single-sex school and
the historically Black university in our sam-
ple use a gender or a race lens more readily
than student leaders at the other schools to
interpret and analyze their campuses and the
issues that interest them. Historically Black
fraternities and sororities are examples of
organizations with legacies of both service
and social action that provide an unusual,
and often overlooked, source of activism.
Progressive and Conservative
Campus Activism
5Debate is unpopular on campus.Contrary to popular opinion, most col-
lege students do not enjoy debating polit-
ical topics. Often the public hears about
acrimonious confrontations between stu-
dent groups or between students and their
administrations over hot-button topics in
the culture in general, such as the Middle
East, terrorism, reproductive rights and
racism, as well as over campus-specific con-
cerns like union organizing on campus.
Both politically uninvolved students and
current student activists reported that they
do not value political debate. Either they
were intimidated by what they described as
a confrontational situation, or they did
not expect that engagement in formal or
informal debate affects opinions. Most stu-
dent leaders in this study, with the excep-
tion of law students, believed that debate
wasted their time.
Many implications emerge for civil
society of a generation of young people who
do not value debate or do not have the skills
to engage successfully in it. We suggest that,
without a politically engaged population
of young people and leaders who can and
will conduct conversations across differ-
ence, we cannot expect a similarly engaged
population of adults.
6National political organiza-tions successfully influence
campus groups with resources,
mentors, and incentives. Both pro-
gressive and conservative groups from the
general political sphere are interested in stu-
dent activists. These groups regularly
become involved with students, often with-
out having a visible presence on campus.
Some of their methods include: 
• using students as foot soldiers in
electoral or other campaigns;
• establishing campus affiliates; 
• training students to be leaders;
• supporting student-led organiza-
tions such as newspapers or clubs
with training, materials, and
funding;
• engaging student support through
student activities fees;
• providing attractive organizing 
supplies; 
• producing low- or no-cost events
with political messages that tour
campuses; or 
• offering incentives to individual
students for participation in their
programs. 
Conservative organizations use a coor-
dinated strategy of national organizations
to provide these services. Progressive organ-
izations, while more numerous, are far less
strategic in how they provide support.
7A “leadership pipeline” existsfor both progressives and con-
servatives, but their approaches
differ. While there appear to be about
equal numbers of opportunities for lead-
ership development for conservative and
progressive students, each group has access
to different types of such programs. Cen-
tralized training opportunities, from sum-
mer schools to national conferences, exist
for conservatives, but no equivalent, promi-
nent, and multi-issue programs are adver-
tised to progressive students. Although
such training does exist for progressive
activists, it is harder to identify.  
Internships, now considered a necessary
part of a college student’s career prepara-
tion, are available in scores of national
political organizations. Information about
these opportunities is available to students
through the internet. 
Conservative organizations promote
their programs more visibly on their web-
sites. Conservative groups tend to focus on
developing public figures or stars, while
progressive groups primarily develop lower-
profile organizers. This distinction is rel-
evant in part because of the general absence
of political mentors from campuses. Con-
servative stars perform mentoring roles
for students.
8Centrist students are notactively recruited by either con-
servative or progressive campus
activists.The majority of college students
engage in community service, volunteer
work of some sort, or service learning.
These numbers are growing as a result of
directed efforts across the political spectrum
to improve civic engagement among young
people. Centrist students, those whose pol-
itics are neither entirely conservative nor
progressive, constitute 50% of college stu-
dents today. They are the largest body of
potentially engaged students on U.S. cam-
puses. Many centrist students engage in
service work, but are not motivated to join
activist groups on campus.
Surprisingly, neither conservative nor
progressive activists report that they target
this cohort of students. Centrist students
are often the ones who report being “put
off ” by activists’ recruitment styles. We
believe these students constitute an unde-
veloped source of potential activists.

[Of the eight major findings summarized
above, the treatment of the seventh is here
reprinted in full. For reference notes, see the
complete text.]
A “LEADERSHIP PIPELINE”
EXISTS ON BOTH THE LEFT
AND THE RIGHT.
Conservative and progressive move-
ments want to recruit young people into
positions of potential leadership, both to
sustain their organizational structures and
to identify leaders who can appeal to young
adults. What are the mechanisms that
have produced national conservative fig-
ures such as Karl Rove, Dinesh D’Souza,
and Ann Coulter? Who are their progres-
sive counterparts? We researched differences
in how conservative and progressive cam-
pus movements define leadership, where
the organizations of today find their young
talent, and how campus activists who are
eager to work in movement jobs after grad-
uation find employment.
From surveying the main websites of
conservative and progressive groups, we
might easily conclude that conservatives are
more active on campus than progressives.
The websites of many of the major con-
servative groups, including the Indepen-
dent Women’s Forum, Focus on the Family,
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and the Eagle Forum, have direct links to
their campus-focused divisions. On the
websites of major progressive groups, how-
ever, it was often so difficult to find infor-
mation relevant to progressive college
students that we were forced to look more
carefully at each site. In addition, we
quickly found several prominent conser-
vative organizations specifically focused on
campus politics, including the Young
America’s Foundation, the Intercollegiate
Studies Institute, and the Collegiate Net-
work, ISI’s affiliate. 
More difficult to find and seemingly less
comprehensive from descriptions, there are
many programs intended to develop polit-
ical leadership among progressive students.
Examples of national progressive organi-
zations with as strong a commitment to col-
lege campuses as some of the conservative
groups were the Feminist Majority Foun-
dation, which has extensive resources for
its Feminist Campus program online, and
the Sierra Club, whose Sierra Student
Coalition has its own website. After exten-
sive Internet research, though, we found
that progressive programs were approxi-
mately equal in number, if not greater
than, conservative programs. The list we
came up with included 15 conservative
educational/training programs, including
conferences and seminars, and 15 pro-
gressive educational/training programs.
In addition, we researched 20 conservative
and 29 progressive internship programs
among the many regional and national




Of the educational and training pro-
grams, we were only able to speak with
participants or organizers for two events,
both student conferences. One was spon-
sored by the conservative Young America’s
Foundation (YAF), and the other was
organized by the progressive Student
Environmental Action Coalition. At the
Young America’s Foundation’s 25th
Annual National Conservative Student
Conference (NCSC) in 2003, we con-
ducted two in-person interviews with
YAF staff involved in organizing the con-
ference and two in-person interviews with
students who attended the conference. In
addition, we spoke informally with approx-
imately five other students at the confer-
ence without taking notes; one student who
attended the conference emailed responses
to our questions. 
The Young America’s Foundation
describes itself as the “principal outreach
organization of the conservative move-
ment.” Its national summer conference is
its largest outreach event. Over the course
of their week in DC in 2003, 187 young
conservatives heard about 30 hours of
speeches by major conservative figures,
culminating in an appearance by conser-
vative writer Ann Coulter. The confer-
ence’s goals, according to its organizer,
were to educate students on conservative
issues (something she said the students do
not get on college campuses) and to create
a “network of like-minded individuals.” 
The conference format used a traditional
pedagogical approach, with a series of
speakers addressing the entire group. For-
mal interaction in the sessions was limited
to questions directed to the speakers. Atten-
dees across the board expressed enthusiasm
for the opportunity to be present. The
students we talked to saw both of these
aspects of the conference as valuable. Both
students and speakers at the conference
repeatedly referred to a phenomenon that
Kathryn Lopez of the National Review
called the “campus liberal orthodoxy,” and
complained that they did not feel com-
fortable talking about their conservative
beliefs on campus. Thus, they were happy
to be in an environment in which they felt
they could discuss politics without being
attacked. They also asserted repeatedly
that there was no party line at the confer-
ence, which represented conservative views
from libertarianism to Christian conser-
vatism. 
The conference’s purpose, however, was
not solely educational. While the confer-
ence organizer made it clear that YAF does
not try to create political leaders at the
NCSC, the event served as a stepping-stone
for many young conservatives to become
actively involved in conservative political
activism. All of the students we spoke with
talked about networking at the confer-
ence with other students and with repre-
sentatives of nonprofits and lobbying
groups. One, for example, said she got an
internship with Oliver North because she
had met him at the conference the previ-
ous year. At a panel discussion including
three “graduates” of the NCSC, each of the
panelists said people they had met and
information they had received at the con-
ference allowed them to become more
involved in the conservative movement. Jim
Graham, now executive director of the
Texas Right to Life Committee, said of the
conference, “I think the most important
thing I realized is that…there are people
who change the world…and I can be one
of them.” Kathryn Lopez, an NCSC
alumna, who went on to intern at the
Heritage Foundation, said she would not
have known about Heritage without the
NCSC. Similarly, a current law student at
Harvard University said the conference
“connected [her] with the conservative
movement,” and spoke of using atten-
dance at the conference as a credential
with conservative organizations. Thus,
through a combination of educational
events featuring celebrity speakers and
networking opportunities, the YAF’s
National Conservative Student Conference
contributes significantly to the develop-
ment of conservative leaders.
We were unable to find a progressive
equivalent to the YAF National Con-
servative Student Conference, which
led us to conclude that no centralized
progressive training program exists.
Although there are numerous programs
offering training for campus organizers
from groups such as the AFL-CIO’s Union
Summer, Feminist Majority Foundation,
Sierra Student Coalition, and the Student
Environmental Action Coalition, these
programs tend to be more narrowly focused
on specific issue areas, rather than offering
a general training on progressive organiz-
ing. These organizer trainings, which last
just a few days, are generally shorter than
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YAF’s conference, do not bring in celebrity
speakers, and are focused on organization-
building rather than discussing political
ideas. And while there is one program, the
Century Institute (run by the Century
Foundation, a progressive think tank),
that offers a more theoretical introduction
to general progressive ideas, it serves only
around thirty students a year. This lack of
commitment to ideological training weak-
ens progressive leadership development
in important ways. Leaders become known
by their issues alone, and little cross-issue
work emerges. 
Internships
We conducted interviews with nine
internship coordinators from five pro-
gressive and four conservative organiza-
tions: four by email, four over the phone,
and one in person. We interviewed seven
interns by email and one by telephone; four
of them had interned at two conservative
organizations, and the other four had
interned at three progressive organiza-
tions. The internship programs we studied
varied widely in size, from small programs
with just two to three interns at a time to
large programs like the conservative Fam-
ily Research Council’s Witherspoon Fellows
Program, which has fourteen interns at a
time and includes an extensive educational
component. We were unable to secure
cooperation to speak with interns or intern-
ship coordinators at the two largest intern-
ship programs we found in our search, the
conservative Heritage Foundation (fifty
summer interns) and the Libertarian Cato
Institute.
The conservative and progressive intern-
ship coordinators generally described the
goals of their internship programs in sim-
ilar terms, saying that they hoped to get
assistance with their work from the interns
and to provide them with experience in the
policy world. Several of the coordinators
(both progressive and conservative) felt
that both the interns and their organiza-
tions benefited from the degree to which
interns were allowed to do serious work and
were integrated into the day-to-day orga-
nizational operations. Several also men-
tioned that they had problems advertising
their internship programs and would like
to be able to publicize the internships
more widely. At the organizations we stud-
ied, internship programs often served as
points of entry for jobs after graduation, in
spite of the small number of full-time staff
at such organizations. This seemed to be
true more often for conservative organi-
zations.
All of the interns who responded seemed
very happy with their internships. This
response was probably related in part to stu-
dents having applied to specific organiza-
tions and to their self-selection, since those
who responded may have been more likely
to be happy with their internships. The
interns we talked with had varying levels
of pre-internship political activism on
their respective campuses. Some had not
been involved in any political groups,
whereas others had been leaders in college
political organizations and had volun-
teered for local campaigns. Nearly all,
though, regardless of pre-internship
political experience, said that their
internships had affected their plans for
future involvement in activism. For some,
that meant considering going into grass-
roots organizing directly after college. For
others, participation in an internship pro-
gram broadened their view of politics and
allowed them to integrate political views
into their daily lives. In the words of one
intern, “It’s not really my career plans that
have been changed as much as my idea of
politics, my attitude towards activism, and
my genuine desire to make a difference.”
All of the interns seemed to think that the
internships would affect their activism on
campus: they planned to be more active in
groups, and felt that they had gained skills
to make their activism more effective. As
one intern said, “I know that I will take back
new skills, resources, and a greater passion
to help advance the mission of our [Young
America’s Foundation] student group.” 
Those interns who did plan careers in
the political world (whether or not those
plans were made before or after their intern-
ships) clearly saw the internships as step-
ping stones to future jobs. One intern was
preparing to go directly from her intern-
ship into a job at the same organization.
While this direct step from internship to
job is relatively rare given the small staff size
of most progressive nonprofit organiza-
tions, political internships give interns
unusual opportunities to meet political
and nonprofit leaders who might help
them get jobs after graduation. In addition,
interns often do the same kinds of work as
staff members, and thus gain an edge in
experience over other job applicants. Many
of the interns expressed surprise at the
level of responsibility they received in their
organizations. Interns generally cited
these two aspects of political intern-
ships—networking and job experi-
ence—as the most valuable features of
the programs. At the Young America’s
Foundation’s National Conservative 
Student Conference, a panel of three ‘grad-
uates’ of the conference called internships
“essential” for students interested in work-
ing in politics. 
So, then, who wins the leadership-
development race? The conventional 
wisdom is that conservatives are putting
more resources than progressives into
campus activism and programs that
develop campus leadership. Our study
suggests, however, that the picture is some-
what more complicated. Because con-
servative and progressive groups
approach leadership development in
very different ways, it is difficult to
directly compare their programs. From
the information we gathered, it is not
possible to assess the relative effectiveness
of conservative and progressive groups’
respective programs to develop campus
leaders. However, we can suggest some
ways in which left- and right-wing pro-
grams and recruitment efforts seem to
differ. 
The Internet is now the dominant
recruitment tool for programs of the kind
we studied, and, as noted earlier, it was
much easier to find information about
campus-oriented programs on conservative
sites than on progressive ones. This may be
due in part to the importance of college
campuses to conservative cultural dis-
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course. Conservative organizations from
the Young America’s Foundation to the
Eagle Forum describe college campuses as
hotbeds of liberal or “politically correct”
activism, places where conservative ideas
simply are not welcome. YAF president
Ron Robinson, for example, spoke of a
“pattern of viciousness” aimed at outspo-
ken campus conservatives; he maintained
that the “campus establishment is either
afraid of or hostile to conservative ideas.”
Conservative political organizations, such
as Accuracy in Academia, ACTA, or the
Center for the Study of Popular Culture
devote considerable spaceeffort to study-
ing and publicizing their claim of liberal
bias in academia. Since conservatives see
college campuses as sites of liberal indoc-
trination, they put a great deal of energy
into making Internet and other resources
for campus conservatives accessible.
Conservative sites also make various
kinds of appeals and use different kinds of
language in attempting to attract students
(although we cannot tell from our study
whether these appeals translate into pro-
grammatic differences). Conservative sites
make proclamations like “IWF [Indepen-
dent Women’s Forum] is taking back the
campus,” and try to appeal to the individ-
ual frustrations of conservative students.
The Eagle Forum Collegians website, for
example, asks students:
• Are you tired of student fees being used
to promote liberal causes?
• Are you concerned about the bla-
tant advocacy of radical leftist ideas
in your classroom?
• Are you being pressured by 
the politically correct agenda on
campus?
The Independent Women’s Forum sim-
ilarly appeals to conservative students’
frustrations, saying its campus project
offers “information, guidance, and support
for students inundated with rigid political
correctness.” 
In contrast to these general appeals to
frustration about perceived hostility on
the part of the campus establishment,
progressive groups’ student programs
tended to assume that students access-
ing the site were already solidly in the
progressive activist camp, and focused
more on networking and organization-
building. Almost every campus progres-
sive organization featured “networking”
ideas prominently on its site; Feminist
Campus (www.feministcampus.org), for
example, had a message board for student
activists to network and post event ideas,
while JustAct (www.justact.org) talked
about “building a national grassroots youth
network.” The one progressive organization
that used a personal, emotional appeal to
students as a recruitment technique was
Planned Parenthood’s ‘Vox’ campus out-
reach group:
• What would you do if you knew that
anti-choice politicians fight to deny
women and men access to…infor-
mation and services?
• What would you do if you knew that
anti-choice organizations spend mil-
lions of dollars on campuses each
year to limit access to reproductive
health programs and to keep college
students in the dark about sexuality?
What if they were on your campus
and tried to limit your access?
• You’d want to protect the services
and information that you and your
friends rely on, and Vox: Voices
for Planned Parenthood is the way
to do that.
The final major difference between
conservative and progressive organizations’
campus recruitment efforts is more pro-
grammatic. Conservative organizations
focus on stars, while progressive groups
focus on organizers. Groups like the YAF
help campus conservative groups pay for
conservative luminaries like author Ann
Coulter and humorist Ben Stein to come
to campus. The Student Environmental
Action Coalition, the only progressive
speakers bureau program we found, helps
students get in touch with student organ-
izers who live close enough to speak at their
campuses relatively cheaply. 
The conservative focus on ‘stars’ is not
limited to speakers: conservative organ-
izations also seem more interested in cre-
ating future star leaders than do
progressive organizations. Jeff Nelson,
Vice President for Publications for the
Intercollegiate Studies Institute, identi-
fied a unique characteristic of the conser-
vative movement: “I think one of the
principal, even signal, features of the con-
servative movement is its overriding con-
cern for nurturing young people.”
The Young America’s Foundation, for
example, has a “Club 100” program, which
gives students rewards for bringing speak-
ers to campus and hosting other events. The
top Club 100 point earners win a trip to
the Reagan Ranch, now used as an educa-
tion and training center by the YAF. In the
words of YAF president Ron Robinson,
conservative groups focus on creating
strong leaders because they “don’t need a
majority of activists.” Conservatives know
that college students are more liberal than
the population at large, but, with well-
funded, well-organized campus groups,
conservatives can make as much of a splash
as more widely popular progressive groups.
The Path to Movement Work
We also solicited retrospective infor-
mation from young staff people at move-
ment organizations to learn more about the
paths they took to reach their current posi-
tions. We contacted 29 organizations and
received 16 responses. 
Young staffers describe their work
primarily in terms of career develop-
ment, not movement building. There
were no distinctions between staffers work-
ing at conservative or progressive organi-
zations on this issue. Almost all the young
staffers had been active in social or politi-
cal movement organizations in college,
and 100% felt positively about working in
a movement position. Although some of
the job descriptions were clerical or admin-
istrative – not the coveted policy analyst or
media jobs – staffers across the board were
pleased with their situations. Even more
surprising still was the consistency of
response to a question like: How well does
this job fit with what you want to do with
your life? All of the respondents described
their satisfaction with their jobs in terms
of personal career development, with only
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one respondent articulating a desire to
contribute to a larger movement. 
The process of landing a job in a
competitive market during an economic
downturn seems to be very similar for
both progressives and conservative
young graduates. Everyone in our sam-
ple acknowledged the crucial role net-
working plays in landing a job. One
student leader was quick to point out that,
while networking was “instrumental” in
getting a job, “I was not given the job
because my contact knew me. I was given
the job because my contact knew my work
and my writing.” Another took a step fur-
ther back to speak about how, even before
using her network to apply for—and get—
a job, networking had been “the founda-
tion of gaining the skills and background
necessary to secure [her] current job.”
Respondents mentioned interning, meet-
ing key players, getting entry-level posi-
tions, attending conferences, and using
the Internet as part of the networking
process.
When pressed about the role of college
career service offices, almost all respondents
indicated that they either did not use the
service or did not find it as useful as indi-
vidualized networking and web search-
ing. Progressive students often mentioned
Idealist.org as a valuable site; conservative
respondents did not mention a single job
listing service for conservatives. Not one
student from our on-site interviews, in
response to a specific question about
national organizations, mentioned that
they noticed a presence of recruiters from
outside organizations on campus. And no
one expressed the expectation that they
could get either a progressive or a conser-
vative movement job by going through
their career services office. This was true
even at schools in our sample with
extremely pro-active career services staffs.
Although there are probably more
progressive job openings available,
because of the dispersed nature of the
progressive movement, more central-
ized resources exist for conservative stu-
dents to use to further their activist
careers. At times like these, when a Repub-
lican is in the White House, or in any state
with a Republican governor, conservative
graduates clearly have more opportunities
to work near the seats of power; the Repub-
lican Party structure quickly funnels prom-
ising young leaders into positions of
responsibility. Conservative students men-
tioned more often than progressive students
traditional avenues of networking, like
working as an intern on Capitol Hill or vol-
unteering on an election campaign. Pro-
gressive students described similar
opportunities to network, but they bene-
fited from a website for progressive job-
seekers, www.idealist.org, that has no
counterpart on the Right. Conservative stu-
dents often described their devotion to hard
work and the willingness to go the extra
mile as indicators of their commitment to
movement work: “It’s hard to find people
like me who will sacrifice for the group—
take a day off and maybe impact their
grades.” While not expressed explicitly,
some conservative students may hold the
expectation that these qualities are desir-
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such enemies as an end in itself (embody-
ing “hatred of our freedoms”), unrelated to
any acts of U.S. foreign policy. 
Both the earlier specter of Russian
armies invading Western Europe (and then
presumably the United States) and the
current one of our being attacked just
because of “who we are,” are based on
conscious misrepresentation of reality by
U.S. leaders. In the earlier instance, the very
formulation of U.S. containment policy
(the famous 1947 “X” article by the late
George F. Kennan) was grounded in a
recognition—missing from politicians’
rhetoric—that whatever threat was posed
by Communism was fundamentally polit-
ical rather than military.2 In the present sit-
uation, U.S. policymakers have persistently
made clear in their practical measures—as
distinct from their ideological pro-
nouncements—their awareness that the cli-
mate for terrorist attacks is directly fed by
U.S. impositions and assaults on the Islamic
world.3
In both periods, the thrust of the ideo-
logical sleight-of-hand consists in turning
the U.S. role from that of an imperial
power—seeking to control political out-
comes in other countries4—into that of
either a defender of the weak (protecting
“friendly countries” against “Communist
aggression”) or that of being a victim or
potential victim in its own right. But at both
historical moments, those who promoted
the U.S. global agenda evidently doubted
the persuasiveness of their scam. For this
reason, they could not limit themselves to
time-honored practices of fabrication.
They had to scare potential dissidents not
only by propagating nightmares and
red/orange alerts, but also by directly
threatening the personal freedom of any-
one they perceived as “disloyal.”
The arsenals of intimidation are long-
standing in the United States.5 From the
beginning they have had a private or vigi-
lante dimension as well as an official one.
The earlier agents of such enforcement were
Indian-bounty hunters and Ku Klux Klan
nightriders—terrorists by any neutral def-
inition. More recently, during the period
known by the name of McCarthyism,6
they included a large and highly impres-
sionable sector of the population which,
moved by the climate of the times, lost
whatever capacity they might have had to
respect people with unfamiliar convic-
tions and got sucked into types of conduct
for which at least a good many of them
would later have to apologize. They
snooped on neighbors and co-workers,
ostracized schoolchildren, fired workers for
their beliefs or associations, assaulted peo-
ple at public events, and issued anonymous
threats of bodily harm to individuals.
The present-day political climate is one
in which the ground is being prepared for
reenacting such practices on a vaster scale.
The signals of this trend are numerous.
Especially striking is the overturning, via
the USA PATRIOT Act, of consitutional
protections against unreasonable search
& seizure and of constitutional guarantees
of the right to assembly, the right to legal
counsel, and the right to a speedy trial. No
less impressive is the open disdain expressed
by the White House for international legal
norms. Underlying all these developments
has been the willingness of the Republican
party machinery to use strong-arm tactics
to capture and hold the nation’s top offices.7
Completing this basic picture is the growth
of a constituency of often religiously
inspired zealots who are disposed to enforce
conformity—e.g. in matters of school cur-
ricula—by creating a climate of fear.
In terms of identifying and understand-ing what is new in present-day forms of
repression, it is worth noting the changed
historical setting. Several traits distinguish
today’s conjuncture from that of the
McCarthy period:  1. Washington’s expan-
sionist agenda is unrestrained by any threat
of serious military reprisal (the lurking
specter of non-state terrorism is itself, iron-
ically, a reflection of this circumstance, in
which state-based forces disposed to deter
U.S. attacks are essentially absent).  2. The
U.S. government, in its selective rejection
of international law, has embraced more
strongly than ever a culture of impunity
regarding its own actions. This attitude
extends down to the lowest levels of author-
ity and readily informs the conduct of
troops and prison guards.  3. On the other
hand, in comparison with the earlier period,
the U.S. global position is now weaker in
terms of a) negative trade-balance, b)
longterm resource prospects, and c) world
public opinion. 4. Finally, much was learned
from the earlier wave of repression, which
ended up discrediting its perpetrators. As
a result, any new campaign of repression will
need to project some kind of “deniability”
in relation to its forerunner.
In the intervening period, protest move-
ments arose to challenge existing patterns
of dominance in every dimension of social
interaction (class, race, gender, sexuality,
age, disability). To accommodate them, the
discourse of “rights” was radically expanded,
under the overarching banner of multi-
culturalism. The gut reaction of conser-
vative sectors was to ridicule this trend,
often very aggressively (e.g., Rush Lim-
baugh, Bill O’Reilly) and in a manner that
readily encouraged violence on the part of
their cohorts. Government officials, even
when appealing to these sectors, generally
eschew the more extreme rhetoric, but
they do not hesitate to advocate legislation
(including constitutional amendments)
to take away the often painfully acquired
rights of various oppressed groups.
The irony of the “new McCarthyism”
is its attempt to appropriate the discourse
of rights, diversity, and oppression in order,
as it turns out, to undermine the social
awareness that can be arrived at on the basis
of free and open inquiry. A specific instance
of this approach involves the labeling of all
critics of Israeli occupation policies as anti-
semites, a process by which critics are
lumped together with the traditional big-
oted persecutors of Jews. This frames the
complex and fluid issues of victim and
oppressor in the Middle East in a static one-
dimensional way that portrays Israel solely
as a victim and creates a chilling effect on
other perspectives.8 A more general expres-
sion of the assault on free inquiry has been
GUEST COMMENTARY continued from page 2
the proposal, put forward in a number of
states, to require universities to adopt a 
so-called Academic Bill of Rights.
The Academic Bill of Rights project has
identified a new category of alleged vic-
timhood: conservatives in academia. The
idea is to legislate a measure which, under
the guise of promoting freedom and diver-
sity, can require professors to take seriously
(and accept, if put forward by students)
approaches lacking in intellectual or sci-
entific merit.9 The rationale for such a law
resembles the arguments that have been
used to advance the biblical story of creation
against the teaching of evolution in pub-
lic schools. The advocates of creationism
are not fazed by the weight of scientific evi-
dence against their contentions. By build-
ing up political pressure, they have been
able to force into many biology textbooks
the assertion that the literal biblical narra-
tive of “creation” has the same level of sci-
entific validity as the theory of evolution.10
The only remarkable feature of these
campaigns is their apparent embrace of the
same principle of diversity whose intro-
duction conservatives have otherwise
opposed. What is particularly cynical about
the Academic Bill of Rights project, 
however, is the way it treats conservative
academics as though they were victims of
social and political oppression. Conserv-
ative academics, in contrast not only to
members of specific oppressed groups but
also to their leftist counterparts in the 
professoriate, have the benefit of a whole
hegemonic political culture in support of
their outlook. The underlying assump-
tions of their approach are trumpeted on
a daily basis from the highest levels of gov-
ernment and from the most widely diffused
talk shows on the commercial media.
While all this indeed makes it possible for
them to claim that their opinions match
those of a significant portion of the public,
it hardly proves that they reflect a 
serious effort to understand either the vari-
eties of human experience or the underling
social reality.
In fact, the persuasiveness of the right-
wing worldview depends precisely on the
insulation of its devotees from much that
is well known to the majority of
humankind—be it the experience of
poverty or military occupation, the legit-
imacy of more than one culture, or the arro-
gance of U.S. behavior on the world stage.
Not attuned to any of these realities, and
shielded from argument or evidence by
faith-based bigotry, the constituents of
the Right are susceptible to any fiction that
might suit the interests of their national
leadership. They are also incapable of see-
ing themselves as they appear to people of
the rest of the world. And when terrible
atrocities that have been committed in
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their name become known, they can
rationalize them as part of a “moral” cru-
sade and can claim exemption for their
leaders from any conceivable international
norms of conduct.11 No wonder that devo-
tees of such attitudes feel uneasy when they
venture out of their ideological cocoon and
are exposed to the fullness of human
knowledge. 
When we shift our attention, how-
ever, from the education sector back to the
whole society, what we find is that the very
forces which are demanding equal time for
their own narrow perspective are attempt-
ing to deny equal time to those who
might question official policies. It has
reached the point now where people are
arrested simply for displaying protest
signs that might be visible to the presi-
dent.12 But there is a ready rationale for
such measures: the attacks of 9/11 con-
ferred upon the world’s most powerful and
most interventionist country the status of
permanent victimhood.
The view of “U.S. as victim,” along
with the self-righteous anger it has
unleashed, is the key cultural assumption,
the key point of conformity of the new
McCarthyism. Do you dare to question
official priorities? Remember 9/11! Of
course, the social agenda that goes along
with all this is far from new, but this par-
ticular way of justifying it reflects the
exhaustion of all other rationales, and
poses the ultimate challenge—in terms of
its effectiveness—to anyone committed
to humanity’s longterm survival.
Victor Wallis taught political science for
many years in Indianapolis, where he was a
frequent commentator on local media. He is
now a professor in the General Education
department at the Berklee College of Music
and is managing editor of the journal Social-
ism and Democracy. His articles on recent
U.S. history have also appeared in Monthly
Review and New Political Science.
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“THE LORD WANTS US TO
BE FREE OF DEBT.”
Did you know that God can free you from
debt? 
Howard Dayton, the CEO of Crown
Financial Ministries, one of many Christian-
based financial advisers, trained over 1 mil-
lion people last year in the scriptural principles
of Christian financial planning. Local
churches pay nominal fees for seminars for
their parishioners, and individuals receive free
financial counseling and a “budget coach.”
How can the secular world of finance be
Christian? Besides developing a debt repay-
ment plan (known to their grandparents as
a budget) and then practicing spending
wisely—two well-known tools of recovery
from debt—attendees learn the Christian
financial principles of following the Bible in
its advice about money. “There are more than
2350 verses in the Bible that refer to handling
money,” Dayton reported in an interview on
CBS News in February. “In fact, 15% of what
Jesus said dealt with money or possessions.”
Crown reminds its clients that because “God
is the owner of all we possess and that we are
His stewards,… the Lord wants us to be free
of debt.” The spiritual dangers of debt include
the stress of finances, overwork, and less
quality time with family, all factors leading
to divorce. 
In a country that reached record numbers of
bankruptcies last year, Crown Financial Min-
istries seems to have found its calling. After
a 2000 merger between Christian Financial
Concepts and Crown Ministries, Dayton has
been able to combine his local church net-
works with a powerful radio ministry and use
financial planning as an entry point to hun-
dreds of thousands of homes. Nowhere in the
literature of Christian finance is there refer-
ence to the economic causes of debt or the
collective responsibility to respond to insti-
tutionalized economic pressure. 
One of the benefits of being debt-free is
that you can more freely give to the charity





Focus on the Family has 




plans to supply more than
600 ultrasound machines
to “pregnancy resource
centers” across the country
in the next five years.
“When an abortion-
minded woman sees 
her baby’s image on an
ultrasound screen, the
likelihood of her carrying
her baby to term increases
from 54 percent to 79
percent (estimate based
on research done by
Focus on the Family.”
Harnessing technology
for furthering an agenda,
we suppose. 
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N E W S L E T T E R
DELIBERATE DIFFERENCES
Progressive and Conservative Campus Activism in the United States
U.S. colleges and universities have a long tradition of political activism. They are 
centers of intellectual activity; concentrations of young people live in close proximity;
and students can experience new ideas and constructs about the world at school. The
public expects that our campuses will erupt from time to time in response to national
and international crises, but many are surprised when they do.
Deliberate Differences uses social movement theory to examine both conser-
vative and progressive campus activism, activists, and their organizations and also
observes the impact of rightist and leftist social movements from the larger society
on student groups. The author and project staff compiled an advisory committee of
experts on the study of campus activism, conducted an in-depth literature review,
identified and interviewed 86 key student leaders and faculty and staff from 8 repre-
sentative schools, and 20 more graduates who are now interns or staffers at movement
organizations around the country.
The report set out to:
◗ produce a rounded picture of political and social conflicts and tensions on
campus, the campus activism directly related to these tensions, and the
impact of the tensions on democratic principles and practices on campus,
such as tolerance, openness, and dialogue
◗ describe and analyze the nature, goals and ideology of the programmatic
work conducted on campus by national conservative and progressive
organizations, their effect on campus culture, and the types of organizing
being done on campus by conservative and progressive students and faculty
◗ assess the comparative effectiveness of conservative and progressive
groups of the competing social movements in advancing their agendas on
campus and recruiting student activists with leadership potential to their
movements after graduation
84 pp. report includes findings from 8 schools, analysis and resource lists
Available now from PRA at
(617) 666-5300 or www.publiceye.org
Deliberate Differences, a new study of
campus activism, gives you answers to:
✔How do conservative and progressive 
campus organizers differ?
✔Is there healthy debate on campus?
✔What national groups influence 
political work on campus?
✔Can young activists get movement 
jobs after graduation?
